Frijda's theory of money (1914): still relevant for bitcoiners today

This week, Mount Gox, a very large provider of bitcoin services, couldn't live up any more to its services agreements with bitcoin users. It provided exchange and storage services for bitcoins, but due to a technical implementation flaw, the bitcoin holdings of users were compromised. Essentially it wasn't clear who really owned the bitcoins. The website went black and users can no longer claim their bitcoins.

Tumbling off the learning curve
I view the failure of Mt Gox as a logical consequence of the learning curve that bitcoin holders and bitcoin companies face. The bitcoin, although considered decentralized, is just as centralised a system as any other value transfer mechanism. However, for ideological reasons, the developers chose to only describe the technical heart of the system (the algorithm) leaving the rest up to the market.

This open source code approach has some advantages, among which a very speedy development of applications. Yet, we are for some time now witnessing what it means if systems lacks a central authority or scheme manager. There is no entity taking responsibility for the proper application of this scheme so no one is chasing users or companies because they don't abide by:
- usage conditions (demanding user identification),
- security requirements and certification of tools,
- specific legal frameworks.

As a result we have seen a whole community of interested companies and users climbing up the payments, banking, investments and monetary learning curve. The inevitable consequence is that those who do not get it right, will pay a price, while the others continue to learn. Due to the digital nature of bitcoin, these developments unfold rapidly, allowing us a compressed overview of interactions and developments from financial history.

Frijda's theory of money (1914)
The essential lesson at stake is that the usage of any value transfer mechanism does not just rest on its acceptance by users, but just as well on the rules and regulations that underly the value transfer. In 1914, the Dutch lawyer Frijda analysed this topic in his dissertation on the theory of money. At that time discussions emerged on the nature of banknotes. Did they have value because they were exchangeable for bullion, because they were defined as legal tender or because the public used and accepted it?

Frijda pointed out that the underlying legal framework that safeguards property in a society constitute a necessary precondition for the use of payment instruments. Without such safeguards, people will tend to stick to other stores of value rather than attaching value to local bank notes. Until today this effect is clearly visible: consumers tend to hold and use foreign cash or commodities if they live in country with a lot of curruption, a weak system of justice and an instable monetary climate.

Trust is built by institutions and markets
What makes money tick is a solid institutional basis, upon which trust can be further developed. The latter part can be done by a combination of regulation (supervision) and self-regulation (market action). Which brings us back to the Mt Gox cas.

Following the events of this money, a statement was released by the bitcoin companies Coinbase, Kraken, BitStamp, Circle, and BTC China. The industry leaders committ to safeguarding the assets of customers, to applying strong security measures, to using independent auditors to ensure integrity of their systems and to have adequate balance sheets and reserves to be able to ensure continuity.

In sum we can now see both a gradual development of both the institutional framework for virtual currencies and the market-driven self-regulation. This reflect the fact that - whether you like it or not - trust for financial services is always built on institutions, regulations and self-regulation.

History of nationalisation of SNS unfolds quickly .... it's not the endgame that matters

Yesterday evening, the Dutch RTL-news released a number of confidential documents about the supervisory and regulatory discussions on SNS Reaal Group. And while it could be expected that bits and pieces of this process would slowly enter the public domain, I must say this is a very rapid disclosure. It also allows a further reflection on the very recent financial history: the nationalisation of SNS Reaal Group.

The endgame
The details of the latest discussions, just before the nationalisation, are highly fascinating. We see the board of SNS fighting for their bank, clinging onto the hope that:
- the regulator sees that the valuation of the possible losses in property finance should be lowered,
- hence, nationalisation cannot be considered a valid legal option (as any loss would not be sufficient enough to trigger the legal nationalisation bazooka),
- thus: the CVC offer stands a good chance of continuing.

Meanwhile the regulators' view is also quite clear. DNB, the central bank and supervisor, has been very patient and lenient in allowing the search for possible private-public solutions. But at some point they have to draw the line. This point arrives when the SNS-CEO and CFO explain in January to the Minister that it is either the CVC bid or nationalisation. Perhaps they hoped that this would force a momentum for the CVC-rescue.

Instead, this statement may have finally convinced the Ministry of Finance and DNB that a nationalisation was indeed the only option. The proposed deal of CVC did indeed, as our Minister of Finance explained during a press conference, contain too many goodies for CVC with too little compensation for the State. Furthermore, as I was expecting, CVC was asking for something impossible: the committment of the supervisor not to intervene in the coming years. In sum, the private-public rescue action was nowhere near to a solution that suited both the business and the regulatory constraints.

2011- and later... working towards a solution
The RTL-papers also clarify the run-up to the nationalisation. It's interesting to note that at the end of 2010, the supervisor observes that SNS Reaal Group is undercapitalized and unable to really wheather a further storm in the market or the media. From that moment on, all work is geared towards eliminating the risks in the portfolio and getting SNS Reaal to take all necessary action, including the sale of parts of the company.

I think 2011 also marks the start of a period in which both DNB as a supervisor and the Ministry of Finance become aware of the fact that some form of rescue may be necessary. But it's a different rescue this time. There are obstacles that stand in the way of the usual solution: inviting the biggest Dutch players and working out a way to safeguard continuity. This did still work for the smaller Friesland Bank (absorbed by Rabobank), but is impossible for the more complex SNS Reaal Group.

As FT Alphaville puts it, the SNS demise was an accident waiting to happen. While bank board and supervisor were doing their utmost to save the bank, the losses and problems were just too much. In this respect it should be noted that in these years, the politicians did a good job at confusing and complicating the financial markets with their prolongued sovereign crisis. In combination with all the post-financial crisis measures, this meant that there were no buyers or parties in the market that would be interested in helping solve the SNS problem. At the same time, SNS could benefit from the crisis by using ECB-funding to buy time.

Essentially we can see that the years 2011 until the beginning of 2013 all eyes were focused on getting to save SNS Reaal. And in that time the so-called Intervention-law (allowing nationalisation) was also being developed and ratified. It think that this law and the principles of trying to seek a private solution within its regulatory framework, focused the minds of all persons involved, whether bankers, supervisors or civil servants.

But is it the endgame that matters?
We should note that the true accident happened in 2006 when SNS did not limit its risks when taking over Bouwfonds Propery Finance. In doing so they exposed themselves to a continued drain on their profits and capital, which they were unable to neutralize. When the financial crisis further evolved and lead to a further worldwide change in risk and capital attitudes, the situation had essentially become unsustainable. SNS Reaal had become, in the Netherlands, the elephant in the room, that no one dared to discuss.

This leaves us with an interesting but highly hypothetical scenario. What would have happened if, at the end of 2010, the supervisor and Ministry of Finance would have stepped back a bit further. Suppose that they would have outlined that any resolution for SNS Reaal Group would have to occur in a stressed market. Which is a market in which it is hard to expect to get a good deal. And thus, they could have argued, while the financial stability of the market was not (yet) at stake, nationalisation of SNS Reaal or ringfencing of some of its activities were essentially the only two options in 2010.

My guess is that the public might have resented such an approach as being too premature. Yet, if we truly wish proactive supervision, we must also be willing to allow unexpected and early interventions, rather than just the end-of-the-road nationalisations. And it is in this respect that the current Intervention law doesn't help. It details a roadmap for the last part of the journey of a bank in despair, and thus focuses all energy of the involved players on remaining within that roadmap. As such it blocks and diverges the attention from other solutions that might have been possible and useful on the earlier bits of the road.