The evolution of commercial banking in the Netherlands (rise and demise of ABN AMRO)

While preparing for a lecture on bank history, I ran into this excellent working paper by Joost Jonker that summarizes the history of commercial banking (read: ABN AMRO). It's title is: Scale at any price and its subtitle: The rise and predictable demise of ABN AMRO, 1960-2006.

It describes how the essential flaw for ABN, AMRO and ABN AMRO was that the company did not pay sufficient attention to creating a sound cost- and funding basis. Although the retail part of ABN AMRO grew considerably in the 1970s, the cost/income ratio was left unattended and it never really grew into a universal bank. So in the Netherlands the company became a conglomerate of business lines with little insight into its own cost-structure. And then after 1990 the company chose to further expand, while it's internal house wasn't sufficienly in order.

Jonker describes a picture of a company that is unable to get its fundamental operations and cost/income under control, and concludes:
These elementary mistakes were compounded by the profound mismanagement under which ABN AMRO suffered from 2000: the wilful changes of strategy, the continuous and pointless reorganizations, the inability to cut costs, the ludicrous and expensive pretentions of global excellence. Unable to keep pace with its self-defined goal, the top echelon of international banks, ABN AMRO forced itself into a continuous flight forward, justified by apocalyptic visions of an imminent endgame. When that end seemed near the board rushed ahead to get the best deal possible, arrogantly thinking it could control what was really a sell-out.

By now we know the consequences: A sell-off of south American and Italian business to Banco Santander. A take over of the Dutch wholesale-activities by RBS. But RBS, it turned out, was at that point in time not fully ready (or able) to execute such a takeover, according to the FSA. And similarly, Fortis made a leap of faith when choosing to take over ABN AMRO as a member of the consortium. So Fortis ended up being saved by the Dutch state, with the condition that the former HBU-activities be sold quickly (to Deutsche Bank it turned out).

The whole process is one of creative destruction (as Schumpeter would call it). Which essentially means that  there is a re-assembly of old businesses into new forms/shapes. For the banks involved, it means they are going back to basics, re-orientating towards solid cost/income ratios and customer satisfaction in a renewed competitive landscape.

Post offices, payments and the central bank.. finding the crucial letter of De Nederlandsche Bank

Yesterday I blogged about the end of the era of Post Offices here in the Netherlands. And with that, both the Postal Office and the postal order as a payment instrument are officially gone in the Netherlands.

It's interesting to realize that about 100 years ago the situation was quite different. The economy required smooth payments and funds for the business community. And there was quite some debate on the possible introduction of a national giro-system. How that debate proceeded is a long story, but suffice to say that the central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB) was asked their opinion about starting a girosystem in the Netherlands.

DNB replied that it did not have the means and resources but suggested as an alternative to lower the fees for the postal order. Yet, the actual letter in which DNB wrote this to the Ministry of Finance, could for a long time not be found. The official historian of DNB couldn't get it, no one could and we were left with a footnote in the official historiography of DNB that the letter could not be found.

Well, that footnote triggered my curiosity and so I went searching in the national archives and used some lateral thinking. And there it was. In the archives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Before me, the letter of DNB of April 15, 1910, outlining that DNB themselves would not be able to set up a giro system. As such this kickstarted and paved the way for the further development and introduction of the PCGD.

Perhaps you can imagine the rush of sensation that came over me when I found this letter (already about 10 years ago). At that point in time I still thought I would quickly finish my PhD on the history of payments in the Netherlands. My plan has changed a bit however. While I may still sometime officially finalize that PhD-research-project I intend to publish bits and parts of my research on this blog.

So while I am busy writing a 'light-version' of the history of payments/banking in the Netherlands, it is with pride that I present the bit of Dutch financial history contained in this weblog: the letter of De Nederlandsche Bank NV on the introduction of girosystems in the Netherlands.

ING Eliminates savings accounts

ING is these days kicking out all old savings accounts. Among those, the infamous: Rente, Plus and Sterrekening. These were the first savings accounts of the Former RijksPostSpaarbank that merged with the Postal Giro services (PCGD). The accounts were linked to the giro-account and worked as the savings account with the same number. And the names of those accounts was symbolic of course:
- Rente
- Plus
- Ster
creating a acrostichon for RPS, so that the name RPS would live a long time after the merger.

Until this year that is, because the technology of the 20th century is not just that flexible in the 21th.